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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
APPLICATION OF THE SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT
TO UNIONS SINCE THE APEX CASE
THE ACT AND ITS APPLICATION TO UNIONS
WITH a view to protecting free competition and to preserv-
ing the American system of free enterprise Congress passed
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890.' Section 1 provided that
"every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
states . . . is hereby declared to be illegal. "'2 This language is
broad enough to apply to combinations of working men and to
many of the activities of such combinations. Its literal application
would condemn all the concerted activities of striking, picketing
and primary and secondary boycott where interstate commerce is
restrained. There was good reason to believe that the congressional
intent was not to subject labor unions to the broadest application
that the language would bear, and vigorous controversy soon
arose as to whether the Act was intended to apply to labor at all.;
It was argued on the one hand that Congress, if it had intended
to make an exception of labor unions, would have done so ex-
pressly. On the other hand, it was contended that this was a law
to prescribe the rules governing barter and sale, not to govern
the personal relations of employers and employees; a law to
regulate trade, not labor.
The courts, however, accepted the argument for applicability.
As early as 1893 a federal court held that the Sherman Act was
intended to apply to labor unions.' In 1908 the United States Su-
l 26 STATr. 209-210.15 U. S. C. §§ 1.7 (1940).
2 Violations are restrained or redressed by injunction, criminal prosecution and (since
the Clayton Act) civil action for treble damages 26 STAT. 209 (1890). 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-4
(1940), 38 STAT. 730 (19141, 15 U. S. C. 115 (1940).
3 51 Co C. RErc. 13661.13668 (1890).
1 United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council, 54 Fed. 994 (C. C. E. D. LA.
1893).
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preme Court accepted this view in the famous Danbury Hatters'
case,' where a union was held liable in treble damages for a
peaceful interstate boycott. In this case the Court adopted a much
broader view of the extent of the application of the Act to labor
activity than has been adhered to in later decisions. Because the
boycott was a direct and intended interference with interstate
transactions, it was considered by the Court to violate the Sherman
Act, and the lawfulness of the end sought by the union (employ-
ment of union members) was regarded as unimportant.
Subsequent decisions, it will be seen, have restricted and nar-
rowed the categories of forbidden labor activities, and have based
distinctions on the ultimate purposes of such activities, but they
have never departed from the primary proposition that Labor
unions are subject, in some measure, to the prohibitions of the
anti-trust law.
LEGALIZATION OF PEACEFUL LABOR ACTIVITY By ExPREss
STATUTORY PERMISSION
Congress apparently did not approve the broad application of
the Sherman Act to labor, and the Clayton Act," passed in 1914,
contained provisions' designed to withdraw the peaceful activities of
5 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1908), further proceedings, 235 U. S. 522 (1915).
638 STA. 741 (19141, 15 U. S. C. § 17 (1940), 38 STr.r. 738 (1914). 29 U. S. C.. § 52
(1940).
7 Section 6 of the Clayton Act states "... the labor of a human being is not a com-
modity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed
to forbid the existence and operation of labor . . . organizations ... or to forbid or restrain
individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate
objects thereof..." (Italics supplied). 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 17 (1940).
Section 20 provides that -no restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any
court of the United States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an
employer and employees, or between employees, or between persons employed and persons
seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning the terms or con-
ditions of employment" unless certain procedual requirements are met. Even after these
requirements are met, the injunction or restraining order is not to prohibit any person
or persons, whether singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment,
or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or per-
suading others by peaceful means so to do: or from attending at any place where any
such person or persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or com-
municating information, or from peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain
from working: or from ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such dispute, or
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unions from the scope of the anti-trust laws. In the Clayton Act
Congress seems to state in effect that the anti-trust laws shall not
be construed to forbid the normal functioning of labor unions to
lawfully carry out their legitimate objects. The sponsors of these
provisions were disappointed' by the decision in Duplex Printing
Press Co. v. Deering! In effect the Supreme Court held that the
"lawful" conduct which the Clayton Act permits was limited to
that which was permissible without it." Consequently the ban on
labor union activity obstructing interstate commerce continued
to be enforced. Numerous federal decisions" sustained injunc-
tions, criminal prosecutions and actions for treble damages for
activities which had their origin and purpose in the ordinary objec-
tives of a union in a labor dispute.
To remedy this situation was a specific purpose of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act,'2 passed in 1932. This legislation in express terms
exempted from injunction the peaceful activities of striking, picket-
ing and primary and secondary boycott where carried on in a
"labor dispute" which was broadly defined. That the purpose of
legalizing the peaceful pursuit of labor objectives has been
from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so to
do ... nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be
violations of any law of the United States." 38 STAT. 738 (1914). 29 U. S. C. § 52 (1940).
8 President Wilson saw in the Act a "veritable emancipation of the working men of
America." Samuel Gompers viewed Section 6 as the "industrial Magna Charta upon
which the working people will rear their construction of industrial freedom." Quoted in
FRANKFURTER AND GRE.N, THE LABOR INJUNCrTON 143 (1930).
9 254 U. S. 443 (1921).
10 Discussing Section 6, of the Clayton Act the Court said: "... there is nothing in the
section to exempt such an organization or its members from accountability where it or
or they depart from its normal and legitimate objects and engage in an actual combina-
tion or conspiracy in restraint of trade. And by no fair or permissible construction can it
be taken as authorizing any activity otherwise unlawful, or enabling a normally lawful
organization to become a cloak for an illegal combination or conspiracy in restraint of
trade as defined by the antitrust laws." Id. at 469.
"1 Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Assn., 274 U. S. 37 (1927);
United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922), later pro-
ceedings, 268 U. S. 205 (1925); Aeolian Co. v. Fisher, 40 F. (2d) 189 (C. C. A. 2d
1930) ; Rockwood Corporation v. Bricklayers' Local Union No. 1, 33 F. (2d) 25 (C. C. A.
8th, 1929).
12 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C.§ 101 (1940).
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achieved is illustrated in the case of United States v. Hutcheson.13
Criminal prosecution for violation of the Sherman Act was insti-
tuted against the defendant A. F. of L. union which was involved
in a jurisdictional dispute with another A. F. of L. union. The
complaining corporation employed members of each union in
different kinds of work. Defendant union struck and picketed to
compell plaintiff to employ its members to do certain types of
work instead of members of die rival union. The union also pick-
eted a tenant occupying a portion of the corporation's land and
struck against contractors doing work for the corporation. More-
over, circulars were sent to persons in various states urging them
not to purchase the corporation's products. This latter activity
contained aspects of primary and secondary boycott. Judgment
sustaining demurrers to the indictment was affirmed by the Su-
preme Court. Justice Frankfurter, in delivering the opinion of
the Court stated the effect of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in the
following words:
"... whether trade union conduct constitutes a violation of the Sher-
man Law is to be determined only by reading the Sherman Law and sec-
tion 20 of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act as a harmoniz-
ing text of outlawry of labor conduct.
"... if the facts laid in the indictment come within the conduct enu-
merated in section 20 of the Clayton Act they do not constitute a crime
within the general terms of the Sherman Law because of the explicit
command of that section that such conduct shall not be 'considered or
held to be violations of any law of the United States'. So long as a union
acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups, the
licit and the illicit under section 20 are not to be distinguished by anyjudgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrong-
ness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular
union activities are the means. ... "
After rejecting any distinction based on the internecine nature
of the controversy, the Court defined the effect of the above-men-
tioned legislation upon the union's criminal liability as follows:
-... to argue, as it was urged before us, that the Duplex case still gov-
13 312 U. S. 219 (1941).
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crns for the purposes of a criminal prosecution is to say that which on
the equity side of the court is allowable conduct may in a criminal pro.
ceeding become the road to prison. It would be strange indeed that
although neither the government nor ... the corporation could have
sought an injunction against the acts here challenged, the elaborate
efforts to permit such conduct failed to prevent criminal liability pun-
ishable with imprisonment and heavy fines....
"The underlying aim of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was to restore the
broad purpose which Congress thought it had formulated in the Clayton
Act but which was frustrated, so Congress believed, by unduly restric-
tive judicial construction.... The Norris-LaGuardia Act reasserted the
original purpose of the Clayton Act by infusing into it the immunized
trade union activities as redefined by the later Act."1
It is now settled that peaceful strike, primary and secondary
picketing, or primary and secondary boycott, in a "labor dispute"
is no cause for action under anti-trust law even though a direct
and intentional obstruction to interstate commerce has resulted."
JUDICIAL LIMITATION OF ANTI-TRUST LAW APPLICATION' TO
CONDUCT OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF PERMISSIVE STATUTES-
THE APEX CASE.
The Hiacheson case was concerned with peaceful and lawful
conduct which the Clayton and Norris LaGuardia Acts exempt
from the operation of the anti-trust law when such conduct in-
volves or grows out of a labor dispute.
In the case of Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader," the Supreme
Court was confronted with a labor dispute in which violence and
trespass occurred and obstructed interstate commerce. A sit down
strike, accompanied by force and injury to property, was called
and maintained for seven weeks in the plant of the Apex Hosiery
Company, one of the largest manufacturers of hosiery in the
United States. The plant, located in Philadelphia, had a monthly
production of about one hundre! thousand dozen pairs of hose, 85
3" 312 U. S. 219, 231-236 (1941).
15 See Articles cited infra., note 21.
1C 310 U. S. 469 (1940). This famous case was decided on the fiftieth anniversary of
the passage of the Sherman Act.
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per cent of which were regularly shipped outside Pennsylvania.
In the course of the seven violent weeks, bricks were thrown
through windows, furniture destroyed and there were inventory
shortages; the largest item of damage was attributed to the ma-
licious destruction of machinery. The trial court also found that
the union refused to allow the company to remove from the plant
130,000 dozen pairs of hose packed and ready for shipment in
fulfillment of orders largely from other states.
A review of the existing cases could not have failed to give the
Apex Company substantial reasons to hope for success when it
began its suit. Though the Hutcheson decision came later, any
anticipation of the position the court took there would not detract
from the apparent strength of the employer's case here where
gross violations of state law could have been expected to put the
actions of the union outside the terms of the exempting laws.
These laws exempted only peaceful activities. The clear question
was presented whether the Sherman Anti-trust Act would apply
to violent and direct interference with production and interstate
shipment, conduct which was not protected by the Clayton and
Norris LaGuardia Acts, when the conduct was carried on to obtain
a closed shop. Previous decisions"' afforded some reason to believe
that it would so apply. Furthermore, in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Co., 8 the Supreme Court had recently expanded the con-
cept of interstate commerce to include production for that com-
merce.
In the Apex decision, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Stone, affirmed the proposition that the production of a plant such
as this was interstate commerce within the constitutional power
of Congress to regulate, but denied that Congress had exercised
its power upon the activities here. The product market, as con-
trasted to the labor market is a market in which the Sherman Act
operates to preserve free competition. The Act was designed to
IT U. M. W. v. Coronado Coal Co., 268 U. S. 295 (1925); Loewe v. Lawlor, cited at
note 5 supra; cases cited at note 11 supra.
Is 301 U. S. 1 (1937).
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prevent restraints "... which tended to restrict production, raise
prices, or otherwise control the market to the detriment of pur-
chasers or consumers of goods and services."' 9 It "was not enacted
to police interstate transportation, or to afford a remedy for
wrongs which are actionable under state law and result from com-
binations or conspiracies which fall short, both in their purpose
and effect, of any form of market control of a commodity ...
This decision so limits the operation of the Anti-trust Act upon
labor union activity that the result seems to be a complete libera-
tion of unions from the prohibitions of the Act so long as the
ultimate goals pursued are the normal aims of labor. Certainly
the decision affords a basis for speculation as to what, if any,
labor union activities and practices are left subject to the Sherman
Act.
The opinion in the Apex case definitely affirmed the conclusions
of early cases to the effect that there are certain objectives which
cannot be sought by a union without violating the anti-trust laws.
The Apex decision did not purport to overrule those cases, but
distinguished them on the ground that there was in each of them
some form of restraint on commercial competition in the market-
ing of goods and services. The validity of this distinction has been
questioned, and certainly the comments in the legal journals and
in subsequent decisions seem agreed that the Apex case did not pre-
serve the status quo. -" On the contrary, the designation of this
decision as A New Federal Charter For Trade Unionism2 2 sug-
19 310 U. S. 469, 495 (1940).
201d. at 512.
21 Schmidt, The Application of the Antitrust Laws to Labor: A New Era, 19 TEX L.
REv. 256 (1941); Tunks, A New Charter jor Trade Unionism; 41 COL. L. REv. 969
(1941) ; Larson, May Peaceful Picketing Be Enjoined? 22 TEx. L. Rrv. 392 (1944) ;
Cavers, And What of the Apex Case Now? 8 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 516 (1941) ; Cavers,
Labor v. The Sherman Act, 8 U. or Cm. L. Rev. 246 (1941) ; Gregory., The Sherman Act
v. Labor, 8 U. or Cm. L. Rsv. 222 (1941); McLaughlin, Bottlenecks (Union Made
Included) 8 U. or Cm. L. REv. 215 (1941) ; Steffen, Labor Activities in Restraint of
Trade: The Apex Case, 50 YALE L. J. 787 (1941) ; Note, 45 COL. L. Ru. 272 (1945) ;
comment, 54 YALE L J. 853 (1945) ; note 59 HAaV. L. REV. 295 (1945) ; cases cited at
notes 24-44 infra.
22 Tunks, supra note 21.
[Vol. 2
1948] APPLICATION OF SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT 101
gests the typical law review appraisal of its effect,2  and the cases
hereinafter considered reveal that the federal courts have thought
it a landmark case in the field of anti-trust law as applied to labor
unions.
Two Supreme Court decisions in recent years have further de-
lineated the application of the Sherman Act to labor unions and
their activities. These two decisions are Hunt v. Crumboch2" and
Allen Bradley Co. v. Int. Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.25
The Hunt case is an instance of deliberate destruction of an
interstate business by a union actuated by malicious motives. A
member of defendant union had been murdered in the course of
a violent labor dispute. A member of plaintiff interstate trucking
partnership was believed by the union to be guilty of the crime,
though be had been tried for it and acquitted. The union refused
to allow its members to work for the Hunt partnership or to allow
Hunt employees to join the union. Through the use of its closed
shop agreements with plaintiff's customers, it forced the firm out
of business. In a suit for injunction under the Sherman Act the
lower courts held for the union on the authority of the Apex case
because the restraint of trade did not affect prices or price com-
petition." The Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that Congress
in the Sherman Act and subsequent legislation had manifested
an intent that refusal to accept personal employment should not
be considered a violation of anti-trust laws so long as the refusal
23 While many scholars agreed with the principle and policy of the decision, others
disagreed. An example of rather pointed criticism is that of Professor McLaughlin who
states: "In order to apply the National Labor Relations Act to the extent demanded by
labor, the Court, under strong pressure from the 'Court-packing plan.' in 1937, over-
threw substantially all established limitations on the concept of what directly and sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce so as to come within the commerce clause of the
constitution. The Apex case, in 1940, presented the question whether the New Deal
majority would take the bitter with the sweet and recognize the extension of the inter-
state commerce power to reach the excesses of labor. As was then to be anticipated, how-
ever, the majority found an opening in minor variations in the language between the
Sherman Act and the Labor Act, and decided that Congress did not try to use all its
power in the Sherman Act." McLaughlin, supra note 21, at 220.
24 325 U. S. 821 (1945).
25 325 U. S. 797 (1945) ; Later Proceedings 164 F. (2d) 71.
26 143 F. (2d) 902, 903 (C. C. A. 3d 1944), 47 F. Supp. 571, 573 (E. D. Pa. 1942).
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was in union self-interest. It was immaterial that the motives of
the union were not commendable. The Court made the following
comment:
".... if a group of petitioner's business competitors had conspired to
suppress petitioner's business by refusing to deal with it, such a combi-
nation would have violated the Sherman Act, and a labor union which
aided and abetted such a group would have been equally guilty." 
2 T
In the Allen-Bradley case, the defendant, a local union of the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, incorporated
in wage-hour and closed shop agreements its promise that union
members would not work on goods other than those produced by
local unionized manufacturers. The Union, in cooperation with
local manufacturers and contractors, used primary and secondary
boycott and other peaceful labor pressures to achieve for these
three interests such a monopoly of business in the New York City
area that goods and services from without the area were effec-
tually excluded. Competition was extinguished, and prices rose
sharply. Plaintiff's products, coming from plants located outside
the New York City area, were excluded regardless of whether or
not plaintiffs had harmonious relations and agreements with locals
of the same national organization."' The activities were held viola-
tions of the Sherman Act although carried on to further union
interests. Whether particular activities violate the Act may depend
on whether the union acts alone or in combination with a business
group. Business monopolies are outlawed, and a business mon-
opoly is no less such because a labor union participates.
Another aspect of the Supreme Court doctrine is seen in Colum-
bia River Packers' Assn. v. Hinton.' A C.I.O. union consisting of
27325 U. S. 821, 824 (1945).
28 "The boycott ... is virtually complete against manufacturers, such as plaintiffs,
who have no working agreements with local 3. It makes no difference that most of the
plaintiffs are located without the jurisdiction of local 3 and hence could never bargain
collectively with it in any event, or that some of the plaintiffs are already working under
harmonious agreements with other unions." 325 U. S. 797, 819 (1945).
29315 U. S. 143 (1942). Accord: Hawaiian Tuna Packers, Ltd. v. Int. Longshore-
men's Union, 72 F. Supp. 562 (D. C. Hawaii 1947).
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fishermen who were independent operators and who, in some
instances, were themselves employers declared a boycott against
plaintiff packers to compel agreement to buy fish from C.I.O.
fishermen only. In granting injunction against the union the Su-
preme Court, speaking through Justice Black, said:
"We think the court below was in error in holding this controversy a
'labor dispute' within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. That a
dispute among businessmen over the terms of a contract for the sale of
fish is something different from a 'controversy concerning the terms and
conditions of employment, or concerning the association ... of persons
... seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment' calls for no
extended discussion."'
Thus, the Court held that a union may so depart from its normal
objectives and activities and enter the field of business in pricing
and selhng commodities that it becomes subject to the Sherman
Act.
A tentative generalization may be stated on the basis of the
Apex, Hutcheson, and Hinton cases. If a union combines with an
employer group with the purpose of achieving a monopolistic ad-
vantage for the latter, the combination falls within the ban of the
Sherman Act even though the union has the purpose of gaining
for its membership security of employment and improvement of
wages and conditions (Allen Bradley case). If the union does not
combine with an employer group, it is more difficult to find a
violation of the Sherman Act if the union is promoting a purely
union purpose (Hunt case). But if the union has assumed the
character of a business enterprise, it is subject to the Act (Hinton
case).
Cases in the lower federal courts appear consistent with this
generalization.
United States v. Lumber Institute of Alleghen ,Cointy 11 ,6held
that when an association composed of representatives of millwork
manufacturers, building contractors, and a carpenters' union ob-
so Id. at 145.
31 35 F. Supp. 191 (W. D. Pa. 1940).
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tains the use of union pressures to exclude out-of-state millwork,
such association is guilty of violation and liable to the criminal
penalties of the anti-trust laws.
Criminal liability is incurred by both the union " and the associa-
tion of employers' when they combine to fix and maintain prices
of electrical equipment by means of union agreement, in exchange
for closed shop contracts, that union members will refuse to work
on any such equipment that has been manufactured in other
states.
Authors of a theatrical production who work as independent
businessmen and market their finished product violate the anti-
trust law by entering into an agreement with the guild of which
they are members for price fixing, compulsory arbitration and
dealing with guild members only. The guild is also guilty of
violation by entering into the agreement. In this situation the
parties are not in and do not contemplate an employer-employee
relationship."'
Again Philadelphia Record Co. v. Manufacturing Photo-En-
gravers Assn."3 held that proof of a combination of labor and
business, instigated by business, to put an end to night commercial
photo-engraving work would justify injunction at the suit of a
party whose interstate commercial engraving business was thereby
destroyed. Eliminating competition for the benefit of an employer
was not a legitimate labor objective. Therefore, there was no
labor dispute, and this combination, designed to restrain or con-
trol the supply entering and moving in interstate commerce or the
price of a commodity in interstate markets, was a "combination
or conspiracy in restraint of trade" within the scope of the Sher-
man Act. The above-mentioned cases and others"6 hold, like the
32 United States v. Local Union No. 3, Int. Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, 42 F. Supp.
783 (S. D. N. Y. 1941).
3s United States v. New York Elec. Contractors Assn., 42 F. Supp. 789 (S. D. N. Y.
1941).
34 Ring v. Spina, 148 F. (2d) 647 (C. C. A. 2d 1945).
35 155 F. (2d) 799 (C. C. A. 3d 1946).
36 Lumber Products Assn. v. United States, 144 F. 2d 546 (C. C. A. (9th) 1944);
Albrecht v. Kinsella, 119 F. (2d) 1003 (C. C. A. 7th 1941) ; United States v. Associ.
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Allen-Bradley and Hinton cases, that if a union combines with an
employer and uses its labor weapons to exclude competitors from
the market, or in order to effectuate a division of the market or
the fixing of prices, or if it pursues these objectives in the char-
acter of a business institution, then the immunities of the permis-
sive laws cannot be claimed and the anti-trust law is violated. The
status of such activities, held anti-trust violations before 7 the
Apex case, has not been altered by this case or by statute.
To be distinguished from these cases is United States v. Bay
Area Painters and Decorators Joint Comnittee." The court held
the above rule not applicable to an agreement between employees
and employers not to use spray painting equipment. Such an
agreement was found to be within the union's rights in absence
of specific intent to fix prices or suppress competition. Judicial
notice was taken of a health hazard involved in spray painting.
Reasonable demands as to conditions of employment, said the
District Court, do not, because accepted by the employer, become
a combination with a business interest in violation of the Act.
A point which was prominent in early cases but which has not
lately been considered important was revived in obiter remarks
of the federal district court in United States v. Gold." A union
was prosecuted under the anti-trust laws for enforcing an inter-
state boycott against a tanning plant. The court held for the union
on the grounds that the ultimate purpose of the boycott was to
secure jobs for union members and that market control was not
attempted. But in addition to these grounds the court emphasized
the fact that the quantity of goods produced in the boycotted plant
was insufficient to affect prices in the national market. It may be
ated Plumbing and Heating Merchants, 38 F. Supp. 769 (W. D. Wash. 1941) ; Loew's
lncorprated v. Basson, 46 F. Supp. 66. 72 (S. D. N. Y. 1942); Truck Drivers' Local No.
421 v. United States, 128 F. (2d) 227 (C. C. A. 8th 1942).
37 United States v. Brims, 272 U. S. 549 (1926) ; United States v. Int. Fur Workers
Union, 100 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 2d 1938) ; Scavenger Service Corporation v. Court-
ney, 85 F. (2d) 825 (C. C. A. 7th 1936).
'949 F. Supp. 733 (N. D. Cal. 1943).
311115 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 2d 1940).
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safe to say that the dictum in the case which attaches importance
to the question whether the volume of commerce restrained was
so great that its withdrawal from the market would substantially
affect prices is at variance with the trend of recent decisions.
Generally these later decisions hold that restraint of commercial
competition in interstate commerce violates the Sherman Act
whether the business restrained is large or small. However, no
labor activity is regarded as directly causing restraint of commer-
cial competition unless market control is specifically intended as
an end in itself or is intended as a means to some end other than
an accepted goal of labor. When a labor aim is the objective,
there is, of course, the intent on the part of the participants to
raise their own prices (wages) and also the intent to thereby
raise the market price of their product in the sense that everyone
intends the natural consequences of his voluntary acts. But it is
nowhere supposed that this sort of intent, or this effect on market
conditions and prices, constitutes the direct or intended restraint
on price competition which the Sherman Act forbids.
The following recent cases have held that no cause of action
can be made out against the unions under the anti-trust laws
where there has been no restraint of commercial competition; and
that the anti-trust laws take no cognizance. of violations of stare
law in methods used by a union, nor of the reasonableness or un-
reasonableness of the purpose so long as it is in union self interest.
International Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. Donnelly
Garment Co." held that fraud and violence in secondary boycott
and mass picketing do not constitute a federal violation when the
objective is to compel the management of a factory to require its
employees to be members of the union. It was immaterial that the
employer had secured signatures of all employees in the factory
indicating their desire not to become members.
A directed verdict for the union on the opening statement of the
employer's counsel was upheld in Gundersheimer's Inc. v. Bakery
40 119 F. (2d) 892 (C. C. A- 8th 1944).
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& Confectionery Workers Irt. Union.1 The opening statement
indicated that a bakery plant in Washington, D. C., was closed
because of a strike. The striking employees were demanding that
the employer cease importing baked goods from Philadelphia and
gave as their reason that wages were lower in Philadelphia than
in Washington. The court saw in the plaintiff's statement no show-
ing of anything more than a strike to secure more jobs at higher
wages for union members. Trhough direct restraint of interstate
trade was specifically sought as the means to the desired end,
such conduct is permissible when the end itself is the attainment
of a labor objective in a labor dispute.
That no violation occurs because the demands of the union
are unreasonable or tend to create inefficiency or retard tech-
nological progress is illustrated in the cases of United States v.
Local 807 of Int. Brotherhood of Teamsters," and United States
v. Carrozzo."4 The former case found no anti-trust violation in
requiring operators of trucks in interstate commerce to hire union
drivers within the city of New York, or in the alternative to pay
to the union a sum equal to the union wage for a full days work.
The latter case held it no violation to demand non-use of a labor
saving device which would displace union members, or, in the
alternative, employment of the same number of men as werc
needed without it. Several other cases" in addition to these just
mentioned have held activities which were carried on entirely by
and for labor interests immune from condemnation so far as the
anti-trust laws are concerned.
The last word has not been said, by any means, as to the appli-
cation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. Problems remain as to the
types of agreements which may be made or sought by unions and
41119 F. (2d) 205 (App. D. C. 1941).
42 118 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. 2d 1940). AI'd on another point, 315 U. S. 521 (1942).
48 37 F. Supp. 191 (N. D. 111. 1941).
44 United States v. San Francisco Elec. Contractors Assn., 57 F. Supp. 57 (N. D. Calif.
1944) ; United States v. American Federation of Musicians, 47 F. Supp. 304 (N. D. IU.
1942), afl'd, 318 U. S. 741 (Mem. Op. 1943) ; United States v. Central Supply Assn., 40
F. Supp. 964 (N. D. Ohio 1941).
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which do not violate the anti-trust laws. Doubt may be expressed
that a union always exempts itself from the Sherman Act if it acts
alone and on its own initiative. One may well believe from the
Allen-Bradley and Hinton cases, and despite the Hunt case, that
unions may subject themselves to the Act even though they do
not combine with non-labor groups and do not fully assume the
character of a business institution.
0. L. Clark.
